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Abstract 5 
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Since its introduction, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), or “neural decoding”, has 7 
transformed the field of cognitive neuroscience. Underlying its influence is a crucial inference, 8 
which we call the Decoder’s Dictum: if information can be decoded from patterns of neural 9 
activity, then this provides strong evidence about what information those patterns represent. 10 
Although the Dictum is a widely held and well-motivated principle in decoding research, it has 11 
received scant philosophical attention. We critically evaluate the Dictum, arguing that it is false: 12 
decodability is a poor guide for revealing the content of neural representations. However, we also 13 
suggest how the Dictum can be improved on, in order to better justify inferences about neural 14 
representation using MVPA.  15 
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1. Introduction 33 
Since its introduction, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA)—or informally, neural 34 
‘decoding’—has had a transformative influence on cognitive neuroscience. Methodologically, it 35 
is a veritable multi-tool that provides a unified approach for analyzing data from cellular 36 
recordings, fMRI, EEG, and MEG, which can also be paired with computational modeling and 37 
behavioral paradigms (Kriegeskorte et al. [2008]). Theoretically, it is often presented as a means 38 
for investigating the structure and content of the brain's population code, thereby unifying 39 
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psychological and neuroscientific explanations while predicting behavioral performance (Haxby 40 
et al. [2014]; Kriegeskorte and Kievet [2013]). More ambitiously still, decoding methods are 41 
advertised as a means of ‘reading’ the brain and ‘listening’ in on the mind (Haynes and Rees 42 
[2006]; Norman et al. [2006]).  43 
 44 
Underlying these bold pronouncements is a crucial inference, which we call the Decoder's 45 
Dictum: 46 
 47 
If information can be decoded from patterns of neural activity, then this provides 48 
strong evidence about what information those patterns represent. 49 
 50 
The Decoder’s Dictum should interest philosophers for two reasons. First, a central philosophical 51 
issue with neuroimaging is its use in ‘reverse inferences’ about mental function (Poldrack 52 
[2006]; Klein [2010]). The Decoder's Dictum is a similar but more nuanced form of inference, so 53 
it deserves careful scrutiny. Second, decoding results are some of the most compelling in 54 
cognitive neuroscience, and offer a wellspring of findings that philosophers may want to tap into 55 
when defending theoretical claims about the architecture of the mind and brain.1 It is therefore 56 
worth clarifying what decoding can really show. 57 
 58 
We argue that the Decoder’s Dictum is false. The Dictum is underwritten by the idea that 59 
uncovering information in neural activity patterns, using ‘biologically plausible’ MVPA methods 60 
that are similar to the decoding procedures of the brain, is sufficient to show that this information 61 
is neurally represented and functionally exploitable. However, as we are typically ignorant of the 62 
precise information exploited by these methods, we cannot infer that the information decoded is 63 
the same information the brain exploits. Thus decodability is not (by itself) a reliable guide to 64 
neural representation. Our goal is not to reprimand neuroscientists for how they currently employ 65 
and interpret MVPA. Rather, what follows will clarify the conditions under which decoding 66 
could provide evidence about neural representation. 67 
 68 
                                                
1 A recent example: in arguing against the encapsulation of the visual system, Ogilvie and Carruthers ([2016]) rely 
almost exclusively on decoding results about early vision since they believe it provides more convincing evidence 
than behavioural research. 
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By analogy, consider research on brain-machine interface (BMI) systems, which use decoding to 69 
generate control signals for computer cursors or prosthetic limbs (Hatsopolous and Donoghue 70 
[2009]). Largely because of BMI’s engineering and translational objectives, however, little 71 
attention is paid to the biological plausibility of decoding methods. Consequently, BMI research 72 
does not involve inferences about neural function based on decodability. We believe that, 73 
epistemically, decoding in cognitive neuroscience is typically no better off than in BMI research, 74 
and so forms a thin basis for drawing inferences about neural representation.  75 
 76 
Our focus is on how MVPA is used to investigate neural representations. Since talk of 77 
representation is itself philosophically contentious, we assume a relatively lightweight notion 78 
that is consistent with usage in the relevant sectors of neuroscience: a representation is any 79 
internal state of a complex system that serves as a vehicle for informational content and plays a 80 
functional role within the system based on the information that it carries (Bechtel [1998]).2 As 81 
we shall see, some researchers talk of decoding mental representations. We assume they have in 82 
mind at least the notion of (distributed) internal representation we have articulated, so our 83 
arguments apply to their claims as well. 84 
 85 
We focus on neural representations that take the form of population codes. A population code 86 
represents information through distributed patterns of activity occurring across a number of 87 
neurons. In typical population coding models, each individual neuron exhibits a distribution of 88 
responses over some set of inputs, and for any given input, the joint or combined response across 89 
the entire neural population encodes information about the input parameters (Pouget et al. 90 
[2000]).  91 
 92 
                                                
2 One may reasonably wonder whether this characterization captures scientific usage. Although foundational 
concepts like ‘representation’ are rarely explicitly defined by neuroscientists, there are exceptions. For example, 
Marr ([1982], pp. 20-1) defines a representation as ‘a formal system for making explicit certain entities or types of 
information’, and Eliasmith and Anderson ([2003], p. 5) state that: ‘[r]epresentations, broadly speaking, serve to 
relate the internal state of the animal to its environment; they are often said to “stand-in for” some external state of 
affairs.’ Along similar lines, deCharms and Zador ([2000], p. 614) define a representation as a ‘message that uses 
[…] rules to carry information’ and define content as the ‘information that a representation carries’. Our discussion 
of the theoretical basis for the Dictum (section 3.2) also illustrates that something close to the above notion is widely 
assumed by researchers in the field. 
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Our critique of the Dictum will take some setup. In section 2, we provide a brief introduction to 93 
decoding methods. In section 3, we argue that the Dictum is false: the presence of decodable 94 
information in patterns of neural activity does not show that the brain represents that 95 
information. Section 4 expands on this argument by considering possible objections. In section 5, 96 
we suggest a way to move beyond the Dictum. Section 6 concludes the paper. 97 
 98 
2. A Brief Primer On Neural Decoding: Method, Application, And Interpretation 99 
We begin by providing a brief introduction to basic decoding methods and their interpretation. 100 
We focus primarily on research that has used MVPA with fMRI to investigate the visual system. 101 
There are three reasons for this narrow focus. First, decoding research on vision is largely 102 
responsible for popularizing MVPA. Second, it has also driven many of the methodological 103 
innovations in the field. Third, it is instructive because we have a detailed understanding of the 104 
functional organization of many visual brain regions along with good psychophysics (Haxby 105 
[2012]). Thus, if the Dictum is viable at all, it should apply to decoding research on the visual 106 
system.  107 
 108 
2.1 What is MVPA? 109 
Multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) is a set of general methods for revealing patterns in neural 110 
data.3 It is useful to separate MVPA into three distinct stages (Mur et al. [2009]; Norman et al. 111 
[2006]), which we will illustrate via a simple (hypothetical) fMRI experiment. In this 112 
experiment, fMRI BOLD responses are measured while participants view two gratings of 113 
different orientations over a number of trials (Figure 1A). The goal of the experiment is to test 114 
whether the activity patterns elicited in response to the two stimulus conditions can be 115 
differentiated. 116 
 117 
The first step of analysis, pattern measurement, involves collecting neuroimaging data that 118 
reflects condition-dependent patterns of activity. This step has a number of components, 119 
                                                
3 Some terminological points. First, ‘MVPA’ originally meant ‘multi-voxel pattern analysis’, rather than 
‘multivariate pattern analysis’. The latter is preferable because it highlights the fact that the methods are not specific 
to fMRI (Haxby [2012]). Second, ‘MVPA’ and ‘decoding’ are sometimes used interchangeably (as we do), but 
strictly speaking decoding methods are a subset of MVPA methods (Naselaris et al. [2011]). And third, ‘decoding’ 
is often used in two distinct senses: a machine learning sense, in which it is basically a synonym for ‘classify’; and a 
neural sense, referencing the encoding and decoding of signals by the brain. We make use of both senses here.  
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including performing the actual recordings and preprocessing of the activity-dependent signal. 120 
Our example uses fMRI, but other techniques (for example, EEG, MEG, or cellular recordings) 121 
could also be employed. As in all fMRI experiments, we must make certain assumptions about 122 
the connection between the recorded signals and underlying neural activity.4 Nevertheless, the 123 
end result is the same: a set of data consisting of multiple distinct measurements of activity 124 
occurring during each experimental condition.  125 
 126 
The second step, pattern selection, involves focusing in on a subset of the measured signals for 127 
further analysis. With fMRI, this involves a subset of all voxels or a ‘region of interest’ (ROI). 128 
ROIs can be defined anatomically (using connectivity patterns or architectonic criteria) and/or 129 
defined functionally (using neural response profiles or more traditional univariate fMRI 130 
analyses). Pattern selection also depends on experimenter goals and recording technique. In our 131 
experiment (Figure 1B) the ROI is parafoveal primary visual cortex (V1), defined anatomically 132 
(Benson et al. [2012]). 133 
 134 
The third, and crucial, step is pattern classification. Pattern classification allows one to measure 135 
the discriminability of different patterns in multivariate data. For example, in our experiment we 136 
want to see if the patterns of BOLD activity in parafoveal V1 for our two stimulus conditions can 137 
be distinguished (Figure 1C). A number of classification methods are available.  The simplest is 138 
to divide the data in half for each stimulus condition and compute the within- and between-class 139 
correlations of the patterns (Haxby et al. [2001]). If the patterns are discriminable, the within-140 
class correlation should be higher. 141 
 142 
 A more powerful (and widely used) technique employs machine learning classifiers, which treat 143 
each element of the patterns of interest (e.g., each voxel) as a separate dimension, or ‘feature’, in 144 
                                                
4 It is well-known that the signals measured with neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI and MEG/EEG depend on 
neural activity, but often in complicated and indirect ways (e.g., Logothetis [2008]; Nir et al. [2008]; Singh [2012]). 
For example, fMRI measures blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signals reflecting changes in cerebral 
blood flow (CBF), cerebral blood volume (CBV), and cerebral metabolic rate of oxygen consumption (CMRO2) 
following neural activity. Although it remains controversial precisely which types of neural responses induce these 
haemodynamic changes (e.g., Logothetis et al. [2001]; Sirotin and Das [2009]; Lee et al. [2010]), applications of 
MVPA typically assume that neuroimaging techniques coarsely measure the spatial structure and temporal dynamics 
of local neuronal populations. It is therefore common to use the term ‘activity patterns’ to describe the multivariate 
data collected with these techniques, even though, strictly speaking, MVPA is not being used to analyse neural 
activity patterns directly. We also adopt this convention. 
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a high-dimensional space. Assuming our ROI includes N voxels, then each trial-wise stimulus 145 
presentation elicits a pattern that occupies a point in an N-dimensional neural activation space. 146 
The goal of the classifiers is to find a way to transform this high-dimensional space into one 147 
where the voxel patterns associated with each condition are separable by a decision boundary 148 
(Figure 1D). 149 
 150 
Although a rich variety of classifiers are available, usually simple linear classifiers are used for 151 
MVPA because they provide a principled means of estimating a linear boundary between classes 152 
in activation space. To avoid overfitting, the decision boundary is estimated for a subset of the 153 
data designated as ‘training’ data, and the classifier is subsequently ‘tested’ on the remaining 154 
data (Figure 1D). The classifier assigns condition labels for the training data based on the 155 
position of the activity patterns relative to the decision boundary. The performance of the 156 
classifier is then a function of the accuracy of its label assignments (for example, % correct; 157 
Figure 1D). Training and testing is done multiple times, with each data partition taking its turn as 158 
the testing data, and the performance of the classifier is then averaged across iterations. If the 159 
mean classifier performance is statistically better than chance, the patterns for the different 160 
conditions are considered to be discriminable. Although applications are typically far more 161 
complex than what we have presented here, at root all decoding analyses make use of either 162 
correlations or machine learning classifiers.  163 
 164 
2.2 The informational benefits of MVPA 165 
Before we turn to the Dictum, it is worth considering the advantages of MVPA over more 166 
traditional univariate analysis methods. To do this we adapt a distinction from Kriegeskorte and 167 
Bandettini ([2007]) between activation-based and information-based analyses of neuroimaging 168 
data. Activation-based analysis involves spatially averaging activity across all voxels within a 169 
given ROI, yielding a single measure of overall regional activation to correlate with the tested 170 
conditions. By contrast, information-based analysis looks for a statistical dependency between 171 
experimental conditions and the detailed local spatiotemporal activity patterns distributed across 172 
the set of individual voxels comprising the ROI (see, for example, Haxby et al. [2014]; Tong and 173 
Pratte [2012]). Hence, what distinguishes the two approaches is whether or not they are sensitive 174 
to spatial patterns in fMRI data. Information-based approaches are so-called because they are 175 
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sensitive to information contained in these spatial patterns. In contrast, the spatial averaging at 176 
the heart of activation-based analyses obscures this information. 177 
 178 
All MVPA methods are information-based. Consequently, whatever the status of the Dictum, 179 
MVPA decoding holds an advantage over most univariate methods because it offers more 180 
spatially sensitive dependent measures. Demonstrating that information is present in activity 181 
patterns is also likely to have greater functional significance given the widely held assumption 182 
that the brain is an information-processing system that uses population coding to implement its 183 
internal representations (Pouget et al. [2000]; Panzeri et al. [2015]). For example, in fMRI 184 
research, activation-based methods are often used to infer that a brain region is involved in some 185 
mental process given its engagement during an experimental condition. But as a dependent 186 
measure, mean BOLD activity itself likely has no obvious functional significance. Similarly, the 187 
evoked responses that are the focus of traditional EEG and MEG analysis are not signals that the 188 
brain itself processes. In contrast, if the brain uses population codes, searching for information in 189 
patterns of activation means looking for the currency in which the brain makes its transactions. 190 
 191 
As an illustration of the informational benefits of MVPA over univariate methods, consider the 192 
early findings of Haxby et al. ([2001]). Traditional univariate methods had previously been used 193 
to isolate the ‘fusiform face area’ (FFA) within the temporal cortex, which had been interpreted 194 
as a highly specialized face-processing ‘module’ in the ventral visual stream (Kanwisher et al. 195 
[1997]). Haxby et al. used MVPA to show that face information was discriminable in the ventral 196 
stream even when FFA was removed from the analysed ROI. Hence, their results demonstrated 197 
that decoding methods could reveal information present in brain activity that was otherwise 198 
undetectable by traditional methods. The results of Haxby et al. not only illustrated the greater 199 
sensitivity of decoding methods, but also made explicit the idea that decoding was potentially 200 
useful for revealing distributed representations in the brain. 201 
 202 
In summary, univariate ‘activation-based’ analyses often obscure the information latent in spatial 203 
patterns of neural activity, while decoding affords a powerful tool for revealing this information. 204 
If the brain uses population codes, then spatial patterns in neural data that differentiate between 205 
conditions should be recoverable using information-based MVPA methods. 206 
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 207 
3. Why The Decoder’s Dictum Is False 208 
Significant decoding indicates that information is latent in patterns of neural activity. However, 209 
researchers often draw a further inference: if there is decodable information, then there is strong 210 
evidence that the information is represented by the patterns of activity used as the basis for the 211 
decoding.  212 
 213 
For example, Kriegeskorte and Bandettini ([2007], p. 658) claim that information-based analyses 214 
including MVPA ‘can help us look into [brain] regions and illuminate their representational 215 
content’. and go so far as to define decoding as ‘the reading out of representational content from 216 
measured activity’ (p. 659). Similarly, in comparing and contrasting different fMRI analysis 217 
techniques, Davis and Poldrack ([2013], p. 120) state that ‘[w]hereas univariate analysis focuses 218 
on differences in mean signal across regions of cortex, MVPA focuses on the informational 219 
content of activation patterns coded in different regions’. We have dubbed this further inference 220 
the Decoder's Dictum. Although the Dictum is commonplace, exceptions can be found where 221 
decodability is observed but the interpretation of the results does not reflect this problematic 222 
inference. Instead, decodability is taken as evidence of functionally specialized processing rather 223 
than representational content (Davis and Poldrack [2013]).  224 
 225 
The many fMRI decoding studies looking at top-down effects of visual and cognitive processing 226 
on primary visual cortex (V1) provide a good illustration. For example, Williams et al. ([2008]) 227 
presented simple object exemplars in the visual periphery, and found that object shape could be 228 
decoded from foveal V1. Jehee et al. ([2011]) similarly found that if two orientation grating 229 
stimuli were presented in the periphery, but only one was attended to, this resulted in greater 230 
classification accuracy for the orientation of the attended stimulus. Both of these results were 231 
interpreted as providing evidence of attention-driven feedback to primary visual cortex. In 232 
another study, Kok et al. ([2012]) found that when the orientation of a grating corresponded with 233 
an observer's expectations, this resulted in lower BOLD activity but higher classification 234 
accuracy. Again, the focus was on showing that early visual processing can be modulated by 235 
expectations. Finally, Harrison and Tong ([2009]) found that stimulus information in a working 236 
memory task could be decoded from V1 over a prolonged period of time, suggesting a 237 
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recruitment of the region for preserving stimulus information for later recall. The common goal 238 
of these studies is to reveal facts about functional processing or localization, not representational 239 
content.  240 
 241 
In what follows, we defend the strong claim that the Decoder’s Dictum is false: successful 242 
decoding of information does not provide reasonable grounds for the inference that patterns of 243 
neural activity represent the conditions (or aspects of the conditions) about which they carry 244 
information. For some philosophers, this might sound like a trivial point: of course we cannot 245 
make inferences from information to representation, as there is more to representation than 246 
merely carrying information. Fair enough. Yet the problem is not (just) that informational 247 
content comes too cheaply in comparison to representational content (Fodor [1984]). For even if 248 
we accept that neural representations have content that is partially, or wholly, determined by 249 
information, there are several reasons for thinking that the Dictum fails to hold. In the rest of this 250 
section, we argue that a fundamental methodological issue with MVPA—specifically, the 251 
uncertainty regarding the information exploited by linear classifiers—shows why the Dictum is 252 
false. 253 
 254 
3.1 We don’t know what information is decoded 255 
The Dictum entails that if a classifier can discriminate between conditions, then it is picking up 256 
on the same information encoded by underlying neural representations. The problem is that we 257 
rarely know what information a classifier actually relies on. Indeed, this is most obvious in cases 258 
where we know a good deal about what a brain region represents. 259 
 260 
To illustrate, consider again V1, where we have a reasonably good understanding of how 261 
orientation information is encoded (see, for example, Priebe and Ferster [2012]). Orientation-262 
related information is also highly decodable using fMRI and MVPA (Haynes and Rees [2005]; 263 
Kamitani and Tong [2005]). And yet, we do not know what information classifiers are extracting 264 
from this region. Indeed, it is something of a mystery why fMRI decoding in the region even 265 
works at all. A typical voxel during a functional scan has a much coarser spatial resolution (> 2 x 266 
2 x 2 mm) than the scale of the cortical columns that code for orientation in this region (~2 mm 267 
in humans; ~ 1 mm in monkeys). This means that one plausible explanation about how decoding 268 
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works—that patterns of activity across orientation columns occur at a spatial scale roughly 269 
commensurate with the resolution of fMRI—cannot be correct. 270 
 271 
There are a number of competing hypotheses about how orientation decoding in V1 is possible.  272 
Imperfect sampling of the underlying orientation columns might result in small biases at the 273 
voxel level, which decoding exploits, resulting in ‘hyperacuity’ or sub-voxel resolution (Haynes 274 
and Rees [2005]; Kamitani and Tong [2005]). Another possibility is that biases in the retinotopic 275 
map in V1 (in particular, radial biases) enable successful orientation decoding (Mannion et al. 276 
[2009]; Freeman et al. [2011]). Yet a third possibility is that activity patterns elicited by stimulus 277 
edges, not sampling or retinotopic biases, provide a potential source of decodable information in 278 
V1 (Carlson [2014]). Note here that the ‘biases’ appealed to in the explanations of orientation 279 
decoding are (in some important sense) artifacts in the way the data presented to the classifier is 280 
structured, rather than deep facts about the representational structure of the brain. So long as 281 
there is any information that distinguishes the conditions at hand, a linear decoder stands a good 282 
chance of finding it.  283 
 284 
These issues are not restricted to decoding orientation in V1. For instance, it has been found that 285 
motion information decoding is more robust in V1 than V5/MT+ (Kamitani and Tong [2006]; 286 
Seymour et al. [2009]). This result is surprising when one considers that the majority of MT+ 287 
cells encode motion direction, while < 50 % of V1 neurons exhibit motion sensitivity and the 288 
region does not have cortical columns for motion direction as it does for orientation (Lu et al. 289 
[2010]). Wang et al. ([2014]) observe a direction-selective response bias that appears to explain 290 
this contrast between decoding and underlying functional organization—it is present in V1-V3 291 
but not in MT+—suggesting that motion decoding in early visual cortex bares little relation to 292 
the actual encoding structure of these regions.  293 
 294 
Thus, the fact that decoding can pick up on information unused by the brain, even in regions 295 
where there is a suitable representation that is used (for example, orientation representation in 296 
V1), means that even when prior theory and decoding are in agreement, decoding results cannot 297 
be reliably interpreted as picking up on the information that is neurally represented and used. All 298 
the worse, then, when we do not have converging evidence and prior theory. This epistemic 299 
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uncertainty regarding the source of decodable information cuts to the core of the theoretical 300 
rationale for the Dictum. It is for this reason it is false, as we will illustrate by reconstructing the 301 
theoretical basis for the Dictum. Although appeals to the Dictum are commonplace in research 302 
using MVPA (a point we will return to), the theoretical basis for the Dictum is often 303 
underspecified. Here we reconstruct the rationale. Doing so demonstrates why epistemic 304 
uncertainty regarding the source of decodable information is fatal for the Dictum. 305 
 306 
3.2 The theoretical basis for the dictum 307 
The Decoder’s Dictum licenses inferences from decodability to facts about neural representation. 308 
The principle is evidential: if we can decode, we have reasonably strong evidence about what is 309 
represented in the measured patterns of neural activity. But why think the Dictum is true? Here 310 
we reconstruct what we take to be the underlying theoretical basis for the Dictum. 311 
 312 
The support for the Dictum starts with two seemingly uncontroversial claims. The first is that if 313 
activity patterns occurring in different experimental conditions are discriminable, then 314 
information about the conditions is latent in these patterns. The second is that if activity patterns 315 
represent information about an experimental condition, then there must be some way to decode 316 
that content from the neural patterns. In other words, if internal representations are implemented 317 
in patterns of neural activity, and the brain is an encoder and decoder of its own neural signals, 318 
then the information must be decodable—that is, after all, what makes it a code. While 319 
substantive, these assumptions are not enough to get us to the Dictum. For all we have said, 320 
representations present in the brain might not have the right relationship to information extracted 321 
by MVPA when applied to the data recorded with standard neuroimaging techniques.  322 
 323 
Two additional steps are required. The first secures the link between information and 324 
representation. This requires something like an informational approach to internal 325 
representations and their content. The presence of a statistical dependency or correlation is of 326 
interest because it suggests a causal dependency between the patterns and the experimental 327 
conditions (cf. Dretske [1983]). So charitably, the notion of information that researchers have in 328 
mind is that of natural information, where an event caries natural information about events that 329 
reliably cause it to occur (Scarantino and Piccinini [2010]).  The view, which many in the field 330 
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endorse, is very similar to Dretske’s ([1988]): a representation is a state that carries natural 331 
information, appropriately formatted to function as a state carrying this information.  332 
 333 
For example, Cox ([2014], p. 189) notes that decoding research on the visual system: 334 
 335 
implicitly recognizes that the problem of vision is not one of information content, but of 336 
format. We know that the activity of retinal ganglion cells contains all of the information that 337 
the visual system can act upon, and that nonlinearity and noise in neuronal processing can 338 
only decrease (and never increase) the absolute amount of information present. However, the 339 
information present in the firing of retinal ganglion cells is not in a format that can be easily 340 
read-out by a downstream neuron in order to guide action. 341 
 342 
In other words, vision repackages the information latent in the retinal input to make it 343 
functionally available for downstream perceptual and cognitive processing. A simple 344 
informational theory of representational content has as a corollary the idea that we can 345 
distinguish between implicit and explicit information (Kirsh [1990]), where being ‘implicit’ or 346 
‘explicit’ is understood as being relative to some procedure for reading-out the information based 347 
on how a code is structured. Why should we think that successful decoding allows us to make an 348 
inference about what information is explicitly represented by a population code? This question 349 
brings us to the second additional assumption: the biological plausibility of MVPA methods in 350 
general, and linear classifiers in particular. 351 
 352 
Many views of population coding assume that information can be read out by some sort of linear 353 
combination of components to the code. If so, then properties of the code can be made salient in 354 
the appropriate activation space. As Kriegeskorte and Kievet ([2013], p. 401) put it: 355 
 356 
We interpret neuronal activity as serving the function of representing content, and of 357 
transforming representations of content, with the ultimate objective to produce successful 358 
behaviors […] The population of neurons within an area is thought to jointly represent the 359 
content in what is called a neuronal population code. It is the pattern of activity across 360 
neurons that represents the content […] We can think of a brain region’s representation as a 361 
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multidimensional space […] It is the geometry of these points that defines the nature of the 362 
representation. 363 
 364 
Now comes the crucial step. If population coding does indeed involve linear combination of 365 
elements, then MVPA is a plausible way to extract that information. For ultimately, a linear 366 
classifier is a biologically plausible yet abstract approximation of what the brain itself does when 367 
decoding its own signals (DiCarlo and Cox [2007]; King and Dehaene [2014]). In other words, 368 
because of the biological plausibility of linear classifiers, significant decodability is taken as 369 
evidence that the latent information in the data is also explicitly represented in the brain.  370 
 371 
It is explicitly assumed in the field that linear decodability suffices to reveal an explicit 372 
representation. In fact, Kriegeskorte and Kievet ([2013], p. 402) go so far as to define explicit 373 
representation in such terms, claiming that ‘if the property can be read out by means of a linear 374 
combination of the activities of the neurons […] the property is explicitly represented.’  375 
 376 
Misaki et al. ([2010], p. 116) offer a similar characterization of when information is explicit: 377 
 378 
Linear decodable information can be thought of as “explicit” in the sense of being amenable 379 
to biologically plausible readout in a single step (i.e. by a single unit receiving the pattern as 380 
input) […] Linearly decodable information is directly available information […] 381 
 382 
So the decoding of a linear classifier serves as a surrogate for the decoding of the brain. If the 383 
linear classifier can use information latent in neural activity, then this information must be used 384 
(or usable) by the brain: decoding provides evidence of an encoding. 385 
 386 
In summary, one gets to the Decoder’s Dictum by endorsing several claims: (1) that MVPA 387 
reveals information latent in neural activity; (2) that an underlying neural population code 388 
implies decodability; (3) an informational view of neural representations and their contents; and 389 
(4) the hypothesis that biologically plausible linear classifiers are sufficiently similar in 390 
architecture to the decoding procedures employed by the brain. The latter is what lets us infer 391 
that decodable information is appropriately formatted for use by the brain, even when we do not 392 
necessarily know what that format is. So (5): if we can decode information from patterns of 393 
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activity using MVPA, this provides good evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the patterns 394 
represent the information. Which is just a restatement of the Dictum. 395 
 396 
3.3 Undermining the theoretical basis 397 
We are now in a position to see precisely why the Dictum is false. For starters, note that a 398 
version of the Dictum appealing to nonlinear classifiers would be summarily rejected by 399 
researchers, as one cannot make an inference about what information is represented by patterns 400 
of neural activity using overpowered, biologically implausible nonlinear methods. For example, 401 
Kamitani and Tong ([2005], p. 684) were the first to caution against the use of nonlinear 402 
classifiers: 403 
 404 
[…] nonlinear methods may spuriously reflect the feature-tuning properties of the pattern 405 
analysis algorithm rather than the tuning properties of individual units within the brain. For 406 
these reasons, it is important to restrict the flexibility of pattern analysis methods when 407 
measuring ensemble feature selectivity. 408 
 409 
Along the same lines, Naselaris et al. ([2011]) point out that nonlinearity should be avoided 410 
precisely because it is too powerful: it allows us to pull out information that is present in the 411 
brain, but that could not be exploited by the brain itself.  Hence even though:   412 
 413 
[i]n theory a sufficiently powerful nonlinear classifier could decode almost any arbitrary 414 
feature from the information contained implicitly within an ROI…a nonlinear classifier can 415 
produce significant classification even if the decoded features are not explicitly represented 416 
within the ROI. (Naselaris et al. [2011], p. 404).  417 
 418 
The concern is that information relied on by nonlinear classifiers might bear little relationship to 419 
what is actually represented by the brain. In other words, nonlinear classifiers are too 420 
informationally greedy, and so cannot serve as surrogates for the decoding procedures of the 421 
brain. Hence, a version of the Dictum appealing to nonlinear classifiers would clearly be false: 422 
nonlinear decoding does not provide evidence for what neural activity patterns represent. In 423 
contrast, the standard version of the Dictum seems to assume that linear classifiers are relatively 424 
conservative in terms of the information they can exploit (that is, they are biologically plausible), 425 
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and so provide a safe (if defeasible) basis for making claims about representational content. The 426 
fact that a linear classifier can discriminate between activity patterns from different conditions is 427 
taken to provide good evidence that information about the conditions is both latent in the brain 428 
and functionally available. 429 
 430 
Critically, our earlier discussion of the uncertainty surrounding the source of (linearly) decodable 431 
information shows the flaw in this reasoning. The fact that linear classifiers are biologically 432 
plausible does not preclude them from also being informationally greedy. Linear classifiers are 433 
surprisingly good at finding some linear combination of input features which discriminates 434 
between conditions in a multivariate data set. As we saw in our discussion of orientation 435 
decoding in V1, even when we do know the underlying functional architecture, how a classifier 436 
exploits information in neural data is deeply opaque. To further illustrate the greed of linear 437 
classifiers, consider that in psychology some have noted that linear decision-making models can 438 
be surprisingly good even when feature weightings are assigned more or less arbitrarily (Dawes 439 
[1979]). To emphasise a similar point, when using MVPA there is not even a guarantee that 440 
classifiers are detecting multivariate signals. In a simulation study, Davis et al. ([2014]) 441 
produced a univariate fMRI signal that could not be detected by activation-based analyses, but 442 
could nonetheless be decoded reliably.  443 
 444 
Although a classifier (linear or nonlinear) may, through training, come to discriminate 445 
successfully between activity patterns associated with different experimental conditions, the 446 
information the classifier uses as the basis for this discrimination is not constrained to be the 447 
information the brain actually exploits to make the distinction (that is, they are informationally 448 
greedy). Importantly, it is evidence about the latter and not the former that is critical for zeroing 449 
in on the contents of neural representations. Hence, decodability does not entail that the features 450 
being combined, or their method of combination, bears any connection to how the brain is 451 
decoding its own signals. At best, MVPA-based decoding shows that information about 452 
experimental conditions is latent in neural patterns, but it cannot show that it is used, or even 453 
usable, by the brain. This is the deep reason why the Dictum is false. 454 
 455 
4. Objections And Replies 456 
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We have argued that the Decoder’s Dictum is false. In this section we consider and respond to 457 
some objections to our criticism.  458 
 459 
4.1 Does anyone really believe the Dictum? 460 
When criticizing inferences in cognitive neuroscience, it is common for the philosopher to be 461 
informed that no working scientist really makes the sort of inference. Such an assertion is often 462 
meant to be a normative claim as much as a descriptive one (‘no good scientist argues thus’). Yet 463 
it is the descriptive claim which really matters—for philosophical critique matters only insofar as 464 
it identifies areas of actual methodological friction.  465 
 466 
Do scientists really believe something like the Dictum? Our reconstruction of the theoretical 467 
basis of the Dictum already suggests that they do. At the same time, enumeration is also 468 
illuminating. Here are just a few (of many possible) illustrative examples where the Dictum is 469 
either overtly referenced or strongly implied: 470 
 471 
(1) Kamitani and Tong ([2005]) was one of the first studies showing that orientation 472 
information is decodable from voxels in early visual cortex, including V1. They 473 
state that their MVPA approach ‘may be extended to studying the neural basis of 474 
many types of mental content’ (p. 684). 475 
(2) Hung et al. ([2005]) was one of the first studies to pair MVPA with cellular 476 
recordings. They showed that object identity and category could be decoded from 477 
monkey IT as soon as ~125 ms post-stimulus onset. They state that their approach 478 
‘can be used to characterize the information represented in a cortical area […]’ (p. 479 
865). 480 
(3) In an early review of studies like Kamitani and Tong ([2005]) and Hung et al. 481 
([2005]), Haynes and Rees ([2006], p. 524) conclude that ‘individual introspective 482 
mental events can be tracked from brain activity at individual locations when the 483 
underlying neural representations are well separated’, where separation is 484 
established by decodability with linear classifiers. 485 
(4) Woolgar et al. ([2011]) used decoding to investigate the multiple-demand or ‘MD’ 486 
regions of the brain, a frontoparietal network of regions that seem to be recruited 487 
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across cognitive tasks. They used decoding to investigate these regions because ‘[i]n 488 
conventional fMRI the representational content of MD regions has been more 489 
difficult to determine, but the question can be examined through multi-voxel pattern 490 
analysis (MVPA)’ (p. 744). 491 
(5) An important technique with time-series decoding is that of discriminant cross-492 
training, or ‘temporal generalization’: a classifier is trained on data from one time-493 
bin, and tested on another. In a review of this method, King and Dehaene ([2014], p. 494 
1) claim it ‘provides a novel way to understand how mental representations are 495 
manipulated and transformed’. 496 
(6) More complex MVPA methods, which characterize the structure of an activation 497 
space, or its ‘representational geometry’, have been promoted as ‘a useful 498 
intermediate level of description, capturing both the information represented in 499 
neuronal population code and the format in which it is represented’ (Kriegeskorte 500 
and Kievet [2013], p. 401). 501 
 502 
Some brief observations are worth making about these examples. First, they include both 503 
individual studies (1, 2, 4) and reviews (3, 5, 6), spanning most of the period that decoding 504 
methods have been utilized in neuroimaging, and were written by key figures responsible for 505 
developing these methods. Second, the examples span fMRI (1, 4), EEG and MEG (4), and 506 
cellular recordings (2, 3). The Dictum thus appears to be a fundamental and widespread 507 
assumption in cognitive neuroscience, which has arguably played a key role in popularizing 508 
MVPA because of what it promises to deliver.5 509 
 510 
4.2 Good decoding is not enough 511 
Another tempting reply to our argument goes as follows. Classifier performance is graded, so it 512 
makes sense to talk about different brain regions having more or less decodable information. For 513 
example, although early visual cortex contains some information about object category, 514 
decodability is typically much worse than it is in inferior temporal cortex (IT), a region heavily 515 
implicated in the representation of object categories (Kiani et al. [2007]; Kriegeskorte et al. 516 
                                                
5 Of course, not all researchers using MVPA subscribe to the Dictum. As we have acknowledged, some embrace 
decoding because of its benefits over more conventional analyses, without drawing unjustified inferences about 
representational content.  
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[2008]). So perhaps the Dictum is true if we restrict ourselves to the best or most decodable 517 
regions.  518 
 519 
The problem with this reply is that it faces the same objection elaborated in detail above. What 520 
makes a given region the best or most decodable might have little or nothing to do with the 521 
information that is available to and used by the brain. This is why decoding results can be (and 522 
often are) at odds with the answers derived from other methods. As pointed out earlier, visual 523 
motion is more decodable from V1 than V5/+MT using fMRI (Kamitani and Tong [2006]; 524 
Seymour et al. [2009]), even though it is well-established that V5/+MT is a functionally 525 
specialized region for representing and processing motion information. Seymour et al. ([2009]) 526 
similarly report classification accuracy of 86 % in V1 and 65 % in V5/+MT, though they 527 
themselves refrain from drawing any strong conclusions due to the ‘potential differences 528 
underlying functional architecture in each region’ (Seymour et al. [2009], p. 178).  529 
 530 
Their caution appears to embody the same concern that decoding results may reflect arbitrary 531 
differences to which the classifier is sensitive, without guaranteeing that these results track real 532 
differences in neural representation. Decoding—excellent or otherwise—is not a reliable guide to 533 
representation.  534 
 535 
Another problem with this suggestion is that it entails that poor decodability (or even failure to 536 
decode) provides evidence that the information is not represented in a region. But this is false. 537 
Non-significant decoding does not entail the absence of information. One might have simply 538 
chosen the wrong classifier or stimuli, or the particular code used by the brain might not be read 539 
out easily by a linear classifier. Dubois et al. ([2015]) provide a nice illustration of this issue. 540 
They compared single-unit recordings with fMRI decoding in the face patch system of the 541 
macaque brain—an area known to possess face-sensitive neurons. In agreement with the single-542 
unit data, face viewpoint was readily decodable from these regions. However, in the anterior face 543 
patches, face identity could not be decoded, even though single unit data shows that it is strongly 544 
represented in the region. These results indicate how poor decodability provides a thin basis 545 
upon which to mount negative claims about what a given region does not represent.  546 
 547 
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In sum, one cannot appeal to any level of classifier performance—good or bad—to preserve the 548 
Dictum. 549 
 550 
4.3 Predicting behaviour is not enough 551 
Though not always carried out, the ability to connect classifier performance to behaviour has 552 
been highlighted as one of the strengths of decoding methods (Naselaris et al. [2011]). To be 553 
sure, a deep problem with the Dictum is that decodability fails to show that information is 554 
formatted in a way that is used, or usable, by the brain (Cox and Savoy [2003]), while connecting 555 
decoding to behaviour helps make the case for functional utilization (Tong and Pratte [2012]). If 556 
behavioural performance can be predicted from the structure present in brain activation patterns, 557 
this would provide more compelling evidence that decodable information is used (or at the very 558 
least usable) by the brain, and hence neurally represented.  559 
 560 
The simplest way to connect decoding and behaviour is to show that classifier and human 561 
performance are highly correlated. Minimally, if this obtains for some activation patterns more 562 
than others, this provides some (relatively weak) evidence that the patterns which correlate with 563 
behaviour represents information that is used in the guidance of behaviour.  564 
 565 
Williams et al. ([2007]) provided one of the earliest indications that not all decodable 566 
information is ‘read-out’ in behaviour. They analysed the spatial pattern of the fMRI response in 567 
specific task-relevant brain regions while subjects performed a visual shape discrimination task. 568 
They hypothesized that if decodable shape category information is behaviourally relevant, then 569 
decodability should be higher on correct trials than on incorrect trials. Critically, they showed 570 
that although both retinotopic cortex and lateral occipital cortex (LOC) in humans contains 571 
decodable category information, only the LOC shows a difference in pattern strength for correct 572 
as compared to incorrect trials. Specifically, category information was decodable on correct but 573 
not incorrect trials in the LOC. This was not true for retinotopic cortex. This pattern of results 574 
suggests that only the information in LOC might drive behaviour.  575 
 576 
It is also possible to quantify the relationship between decodability and behaviour more 577 
precisely. For example, in an early EEG decoding study, Philiastides and Sajda ([2006]) were 578 
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able to show there was no significant difference between human psychometric and classifier 579 
‘neurometric’ functions, suggesting that the classifier performance was highly predictive of 580 
observer performance when trained on time-series data of certain latencies.  581 
 582 
While connection to behaviour supplies valuable evidence, we still think that it is not enough to 583 
warrant inferences to representational content. As we noted earlier, there are cases where 584 
decodability appears to show something about functional processing rather than the content of 585 
neural representations. Again, V1 provides a useful test case. Since we know that V1 primarily 586 
encodes information about low-level visual features (such as luminance or orientation) and does 587 
not encode higher-level visual features (such as shape or object category) any decoding of 588 
higher-level visual features is unlikely to reflect genuine representational content. This is true 589 
even if decoded information can be linked with behavioural performance. For example, Haynes 590 
and Rees ([2005]) found that V1 activity was predictive of whether or not subjects were 591 
perceiving a visual illusion, and Kok et al. ([2012]) found that top-down effects of expectation 592 
on V1 were predictive of behavioural performance. In these cases, the connection is that early 593 
processing modulates later processing that determines behaviour.  594 
 595 
Note that the problem is not one of spurious correlation. In an important sense, it is quite the 596 
opposite problem. There is plenty of information, even in V1, which a clever decoding algorithm 597 
can often pick up on. More generally, a brain region might carry information which is reliably 598 
correlated with the information that is actually used, but which is not itself used in behaviour. 599 
This is because the information in a region might need to be transformed into a more appropriate 600 
format before it is read out. As DiCarlo and Cox ([2007], p. 335) put it, ‘[…] the problem is 601 
typically not a lack of information or noisy information, but that the information is badly 602 
formatted[…]’. But even ‘badly formatted’ information might correlate with behaviour. In 603 
summary, merely predicting behaviour using decodable information is not enough to revive the 604 
Dictum. 605 
 606 
5. Moving Beyond The Dictum 607 
We have argued that the Decoder’s Dictum is false. However, we are not pessimists about 608 
decoding. Rather, we think the right conclusion to draw is that decoding must be augmented in 609 
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order to provide good evidence about neural representation. If linear classifiers are greedy, then 610 
they cannot function as a surrogate for the sort of linear read-out carried out by the brain. 611 
Instead, we need some additional assurance that a particular decoding result relies on information 612 
stemming from neural representations. This need not be knock-down evidence, but decodability 613 
alone is not enough to do the job (as the Dictum suggests).  614 
 615 
In the previous section, we considered one form of augmentation—linking decoding results to 616 
behavioural outcomes—and argued that it was insufficient. The problem was that linkages to 617 
behaviour do not show that the information is actually formatted in a useable way. Framing it 618 
this way, however, already suggests a solution. The Dictum relies on the idea that the biological 619 
plausibility of linear classifiers allows them to function as a kind of surrogate—the classifier-as-620 
decoder takes the place of the brain-as-decoder in showing that information that is latent in 621 
neural activity is used, or usable (cf. de Wit et al. [2016]). We have shown that it cannot play this 622 
role. But if the information latent in patterns of neural activity can be used to predict observer 623 
behaviour based on a psychological model, then we would have a more sound evidential basis 624 
for drawing conclusions about neural representation. For unlike classifier performance, observer 625 
behaviour is clearly dependent on how the brain decodes its own signals. In other words, this 626 
approach depends on offering a psychologically plausible model of how observers (through 627 
down-stream processing) exploit the information found in patterns of neural activity (cf. Ritchie 628 
and Carlson [2016]). And as it happens, such an approach is already on offer.  629 
 630 
There is a long tradition in psychology of modeling behavioural performance using 631 
psychological spaces (Attneave [1950]; Shepard [1964]). Here by ‘psychological’ space we mean 632 
a space in which dimensions reflect different features or combinations of features of stimuli, as 633 
reconstructed from comparative similarity judgments of observers of stimuli/conditions. Models 634 
within this tradition characterize representations for individual stimuli or experimental conditions 635 
as points in a space, and observer behaviour (such as choice or reaction time) is modeled based 636 
on the relationship between different representations in these spaces. Thus, familiar 637 
categorization models from cognitive psychology such as prototype models, exemplar models, 638 
and decision boundary models all predict observer behaviour based on different distance metrics 639 
applied to a reconstructed psychological space (Ashby and Maddox [1993]). A virtue of some 640 
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MVPA methods like Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA) is that they help to focus 641 
attention on structure in activation spaces (Haxby et al. [2014]; Kriegeskorte and Kievet [2013]). 642 
In RSA the pair-wise (dis)similarity for patterns of activity for different conditions is computed, 643 
which can be used to reconstruct an activation space from multivariate neural data. A hypothesis 644 
that many have considered is that if an activation space implements a psychological space, then 645 
one can apply psychological models or hypotheses to the activation space directly in order to 646 
predict behaviour (Edelman et al. [1998]; de Beeck et al. [2001], [2008]; Davis and Poldrack 647 
[2014]). Note that this approach is importantly different from the Dictum, as it does not rely on 648 
using linear classifiers as a surrogate. Furthermore, the approach achieves both biological and 649 
psychological plausibility through a linkage between the structure of the decoded activation 650 
space and the structure of behaviour (Ritchie and Carlson [2016]). And since it makes use of 651 
MVPA in conjunction with established techniques for modeling behaviour, it also takes 652 
advantage of some of the strengths of MVPA we have already mentioned. Here we offer two 653 
examples of research that adopt this sort of approach.   654 
 655 
First, a popular and theoretically simple approach involves directly comparing the similarity 656 
structure of activation spaces with psychological spaces reconstructed from subjects’ similarity 657 
judgments of stimuli (e.g. Mur et al. [2013]; Bracci and de Beeck [2016]; Wardle et al. [2016]). 658 
One illustration of this approach is provided by the results of Sha et al. ([2015]), who collected 659 
similarity ratings for a large number of exemplar images for several animate or inanimate object 660 
categories. The similarity space constructed from these judgments was then directly related to the 661 
similarity structure of activation spaces from throughout the brain measured using fMRI. They 662 
found that activation spaces that correlated with the behavioural similarity space were best 663 
accounted for by a single dimension, which seemed to reflect an animacy continuum rather than 664 
a categorical difference between the neural patterns for animate and inanimate objects (Kiani et 665 
al. [2007]; Kriegeskorte et al. [2008]).  666 
 667 
Second, some work has focused on the psychological plausibility of activation spaces by using 668 
them to predict the latency of behaviour. For example, in two studies using fMRI and MEG 669 
decoding, Carlson and Ritchie (Carlson et al. [2014]; Ritchie, Tovar, and Carlson [2015]) 670 
showed that distance from a decision boundary for a classifier through activation space was 671 
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predictive of reaction time (RT). In their experiments they were explicitly motivated by the idea 672 
that linear classifiers are structurally identical to the model of an observer under signal detection 673 
theory (Green and Swets [1966]). A natural extension of signal detection theory is that distance 674 
from an evidential boundary negatively correlates with RT (Ashby and Maddox [1994]). As 675 
predicted, they found that RT negatively correlated with distance from the decision boundaries, 676 
suggesting a level of psychological plausibility to even simple linear classifiers. 677 
 678 
Crucially, in these sorts of studies it is implausible to suppose that the information is present but 679 
not correctly formatted, because the decoded format of the information in activation space is 680 
precisely what is being used to predict behaviour in a psychologically plausible manner. We do 681 
not mean to suggest that the results we have summarized suffice for drawing conclusions about 682 
neural representation, but we do believe that they help point the way forward.  683 
 684 
6. Conclusion 685 
The Decoder’s Dictum is false. Significant decoding, even when supplemented by other results, 686 
does not warrant an inference that the decoded information is represented. However, we do 687 
believe that if behaviour can be connected to the structure of activation space in a 688 
psychologically plausible manner, then this may warrant the sort of inference researchers have 689 
had in mind. And we should stress that we do not think the above shows that decoding is 690 
immaterial. Indeed, as we have suggested, MVPA is crucial for connecting activation spaces to 691 
behaviour. Rather, as we have argued, appealing to the Dictum obscures not only the true import 692 
of decoding as a tool in cognitive neuroscience, but also what sort of evidence is required for 693 
making claims about neural representation. 694 
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